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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 Whether at least one plaintiff State has standing 
to challenge the Executive’s Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Resi-
dents (DAPA) program. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amici scholars are law professors who teach and 
write in the field of federal jurisdiction.1 Our purpose 
is to support Respondents’ claim to standing while 
remaining agnostic as to the other issues in the case. 
We hold varying views on the policy merits of the 
Executive’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program, 
as well as on the legal merits of the States’ separation 
of powers and Administrative Procedure Act chal-
lenges to that program. We file this brief in our 
individual capacities, without purporting to represent 
the views of our home institutions. 
 Jonathan Adler is the inaugural Johan Verheij 
Memorial Professor of Law at the Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. Erin Morrow 
Hawley is an Associate Professor at the University of 
Missouri School of Law. Bradford Mank is the James 
B. Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of 
Cincinnati College of Law. Garrick Pursley is an 
Associate Professor at the Florida State University 
College of Law. Ernest A. Young is the Alston & Bird 
Professor at Duke Law School. 
 
 1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief by 
blanket or individual letter. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.3(a). No counsel 
for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
person other than amicus curiae, their members, and their 
counsel has made monetary contribution to the preparation or 
submission of this brief. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.6.  
2 
 Amici Southeastern Legal Foundation (SLF), 
founded in 1976, is a national non-profit, public 
interest law firm and policy center that advocates 
constitutional individual liberties, limited govern-
ment, and free enterprise. SLF drafts legislative 
models, educates the public on key policy issues, and 
litigates regularly before the Supreme Court. As an 
organization interested in federalism and separation 
of powers, SLF has a particular interest in the stand-
ing of state governments to assert these principles. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 This lawsuit concerns whether the States, which 
this Court has recognized “bear[ ] many of the conse-
quences of unlawful immigration,” Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), shall have any voice in 
the legal regime that determines who may be lawfully 
present within their borders. Our Constitution and 
federal statutes provide two primary avenues for 
State input: the States’ political representation in 
Congress, and the opportunity to participate in 
administrative policymaking through the notice and 
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. The gravamen of 
Respondent States’ claims on the merits in this case 
is that both of these avenues have been shut down by 
the national Executive’s unilateral action in DAPA. 
 The United States is thus wrong to say that the 
States’ lawsuit asks “the federal courts to resolve 
3 
complex debates over immigration policy that the 
Constitution reserves to the political Branches of the 
National Government.” Pet’r Br. at 12. What the 
Respondent States ask – and all the court of appeals 
order below did – is to force the national Executive to 
conduct those “complex debates” in the political and 
administrative fora that the Constitution and the 
APA demand. The fundamentally process-oriented 
nature of Respondent States’ claims on the merits is 
essential to understanding what is at stake in the 
arguments about Respondents’ standing. 
 That standing, by this Court’s traditional crite-
ria, is straightforward. The States have largely ceded 
to national authorities the ability to determine who is 
lawfully present within their own jurisdictions; as a 
result, the States’ own governmental responsibilities 
necessarily expand and contract in response to chang-
es in national immigration policy. One particularly 
concrete instance of this is Texas’s law requiring 
issuance of driver’s licenses to all persons that the 
national government determines to be lawfully pre-
sent. DAPA’s expansion of that category increases 
Texas’s costs, and that is sufficient for injury in fact. 
 The United States does not, in fact, challenge the 
Respondent States’ standing on traditional grounds. 
Instead, it has invented novel requirements without 
support in this Court’s cases, such as a broad rule 
against “self-inflicted injury.” And it has suggested 
that the fact that the plaintiffs here are States should 
cut against standing because that somehow trans-
forms a legal dispute over statutory authorization 
4 
and administrative process into a political controver-
sy. Neither of these departures from this Court’s cases 
can withstand scrutiny. 
 Standing in this case requires no special stand-
ing loophole for state governments. It simply requires 
recognition that Respondents are governments, with 
responsibilities that are in part a function of whom 
federal law permits to be lawfully present within 
their jurisdictions. Amici take no position on whether 
Respondents should prevail on their claims, much 
less on what national immigration policy should be. 
But there is no doubt that they have standing simply 
to demand access to national debates about immigra-
tion policy.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. Texas’s straightforward injury in fact 
arises directly from its responsibilities as 
a state government. 
 Although Texas alleges a variety of injuries, this 
litigation has focused on the expenses the State will 
incur on account of DAPA’s expansion of the class of 
persons eligible to apply for state driver’s licenses. 
The United States has characterized this injury as a 
contrivance based on a quirk of state law. That is 
unfair and misleading. The point is simply that both 
the national and state governments are responsible 
for caring for all persons lawfully present within their 
jurisdictions. When the national Executive expands 
5 
that category by deeming over four million unlawfully 
present aliens “lawfully present,” Pet. App. 413a, the 
costs of governing not only for the national govern-
ment but also for state and local governments in-
crease drastically. Texas’s driver’s license program is 
simply one particularly concrete example of those 
increased costs. It is sufficient to answer the standing 
question in this case. 
 
A. Texas’s responsibility for issuing driv-
er’s licenses plainly meets this Court’s 
test for Article III standing. 
 Article III requires a concrete injury in fact, 
fairly traceable to the challenged government conduct 
and redressable by the requested relief. Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997). The costs of issuing 
driver’s licenses are plainly concrete and quantifiable 
in monetary terms, although this is not required.2 Nor 
is the injury widely shared; rather, as a cost of gov-
ernance, it is shared only by other states with similar 
driver’s license regimes. 
 The United States has not challenged traceability 
or redressability here, nor could it do so.3 Because 
 
 2 See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998) (finding 
“informational injury” based on an agency’s failure to enforce dis-
closure requirements to be “sufficiently concrete and specific”). 
 3 The United States’ novel argument that Texas’s injury is 
“self-inflicted” does ultimately go to traceability, but it does not 
claim that the relation between DAPA and the State’s increased 
costs is factually attenuated or uncertain. See infra Part II 
(considering the “self-inflicted” argument).  
6 
standing does not turn on the magnitude of the 
impending injury, it does not matter whether all or 
even a large number of persons made eligible to 
remain in the United States by DAPA apply for Texas 
driver’s licenses. The United States does not appear 
to dispute that some of those persons will apply for 
driver’s licenses,4 and that is sufficient to establish 
traceability. And of course if the requested injunction 
renders those persons ineligible to apply, Texas will 
not incur the costs of issuing them licenses.5 
 Critically, the district court held a hearing on 
these matters and grounded its standing ruling in 
specific findings of fact. Those findings of fact con-
cerning the causal connections between DAPA and 
Texas’s injury – which were affirmed by the court of 
appeals – can be set aside only for clear error.6 The 
 
 4 The court of appeals found that “it is apparent that many 
would do so.” Pet. App. at 30a. 
 5 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25 (2007) 
(holding that that plaintiffs may attack a government decision 
even if it is merely an incremental cause of their injuries, and 
even if the requested relief would only incrementally mitigate 
those injuries); Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167-68 (holding sufficient to 
establish an injury to plaintiffs that the agency was likely to 
reduce the amount of water available to all affected parties, even 
though it was not yet clear precisely how much plaintiffs’ own 
allocation would be reduced). 
 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
564, 573-74 (1985). Much of the Intervenors’ standing discussion 
asks this Court to look behind the district court’s finding, see 
Brief for Intervenors-Respondents Jane Does in Support of 
Petitioner (Intervenor Br.) at 30-32, but Intervenors’ speculation 
hardly demonstrates clear error. 
7 
United States has not argued that any finding by the 
district court was clearly erroneous. 
 The United States argues instead that the cost of 
applications for state benefits is “incidental” to the 
main purpose of DAPA, which is to determine whom 
may remain within the country. That is no doubt true; 
no one says the United States embarked upon this 
policy with the malign purpose of imposing costs on 
state governments. But this Court’s standing cases 
recognize no doctrine of “incidental” injury. Govern-
ment policies frequently inflict harm on parties as a 
side effect of the government’s primary policy goal. 
The injuries are no less injurious for that, and this 
Court has frequently relied upon such injuries in 
recognizing standing.7 Respondent States do not lack 
standing here simply because their injuries may be 
characterized as collateral damage. 
 
B. The cost of issuing driver’s licenses to 
DAPA beneficiaries is simply one ex-
ample of the way DAPA expands the 
responsibilities of state governments. 
 Although the United States characterizes immi-
gration as an area of exclusive federal authority, this 
 
 7 See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167-68 (finding injury in fact 
where plaintiffs challenged an agency’s opinion on biological 
impacts on endangered species, where that would incidentally 
result in a reduction in water available for their irrigation 
operations).  
8 
Court’s cases have recognized that the matter is 
significantly more complex. This Court struck down 
most of Arizona’s effort to ratchet up immigration 
enforcement in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012), but it upheld that same State’s measures 
limiting employment of undocumented aliens in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 
(2011).8 State law and policy are intertwined with the 
federal immigration regime in a variety of ways.9 And 
this Court has acknowledged that States bear many 
of the costs of unlawful immigration. See Arizona, 132 
S. Ct. at 2500. 
 More fundamentally, immigration regulation is 
unique in that it concerns the scope of the body politic 
itself. As Justice Scalia observed in Arizona, “the 
power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people 
who have no right to be there” is “the defining charac-
teristic of sovereignty.” 132 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). That is because power to determine who 
can enter and who can remain impacts every other 
function of government. Aliens pervasively interact, 
for example, with state laws and policies concerning 
healthcare, education, employment, and public safety. 
See generally Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
 
 8 See also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding 
state law prohibiting employment of unauthorized aliens). The 
United States’ brief cites Arizona v. United States extensively; it 
does not acknowledge Whiting or the actual holding of De Canas. 
 9 See Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567 (2008). 
9 
Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (observing 
that States have an “easily identified” “sovereign in-
terest” in “the exercise of sovereign power over indi-
viduals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction”). 
 Although the States have ceded authority to the 
national government to determine who may lawfully 
be present within their jurisdictions, that concession 
hardly erases the profound impact of those determi-
nations upon legitimate state interests. It is hard to 
think of another aspect of federal policy that more 
directly affects state governance. To pretend that 
States cannot be injured by federal immigration 
decisions is to close one’s eyes to the way the world 
actually works.  
 
C. Texas does not lack standing as a mere 
“beneficiary” of federal regulation. 
 The United States suggests Texas lacks standing 
because it is not directly regulated by federal immi-
gration laws. See Pet’r Br. at 20-22. This argument 
fails for two reasons. First and foremost, Texas’s 
standing rests on the various ways in which DAPA 
affects Texas’s own responsibilities as a governmental 
regulator and provider of government benefits. Texas 
need not rely on its status as “beneficiary” of federal 
regulation for standing. Second, notwithstanding the 
United States’ suggestion, no categorical rule bars 
beneficiaries of federal regulation from challenging 
the national government’s administration of federal 
programs. 
10 
 It is certainly true that persons actually subject 
to regulatory action nearly always have standing to 
challenge that action; their difficulties generally 
involve timing of review. And it is also true that 
persons challenging governmental regulation of 
others have faced higher hurdles to establish stand-
ing. But it has never been the case that plaintiffs in 
the latter category were categorically excluded from 
seeking judicial review of government decisions.10 
 Typically, beneficiaries of regulation struggle to 
establish standing to challenge agency decisions 
because, not being direct subjects of regulation, 
their traceability and redressability scenarios involve 
a more attenuated string of causal relationships.11 
 
 10 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 
139, 153-56 (2010) (upholding conventional alfalfa growers’ 
standing to challenge agency order deregulating genetically-
modified alfalfa on account of possible impacts on their own 
crops); Akins, 524 U.S. at 11 (upholding voters’ standing to 
challenge FEC’s decision not to enforce registration and report-
ing requirements against another organization); Clarke v. Sec. 
Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (holding securities broker 
association had standing to challenge agency’s policy regulating 
national banks). 
 11 In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), for example, this 
Court denied standing to parents of black children attending 
public schools to challenge the Internal Revenue Service’s 
alleged failure to deny tax-exempt status to segregated private 
schools. Pointing out that neither the private schools nor the 
families attending them were parties to the litigation, the Court 
held it was too uncertain that the IRS’s decisions had under-
mined desegregation in the public schools or that reversal of 
those decisions would result in a desegregated education for the 
plaintiffs’ children. See id. at 756-58. 
11 
And to the extent that the United States warns of an 
avalanche of litigation if the States prevail here, 
traceability and redressability are likely to remain 
significant obstacles in many contexts. But aside from 
asserting that Texas’s injury is self-inflicted, the 
United States has not contested that Article III’s 
causation requirements are met here. Apart from 
those requirements, there is no freestanding re-
striction on claims by regulatory beneficiaries.12 
 In any event, Texas and the other Respondent 
States need not rest their standing on their status as 
regulatory beneficiaries. To be sure, they do have 
interests that fall into that category. Many have 
argued that illegal immigration undermines the 
interests of legal workers and increases crime, and to 
the extent this is true the citizens of Respondent 
States benefit from the national government’s en-
forcement of the immigration law. In their capacity as 
 
 12 The United States and its amici cite Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984), for the proposition that plain-
tiffs have no “judicially cognizable interest in procuring en-
forcement of the immigration laws” against another, Pet’r Br. at 
20; Brief for Professor Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners (Dellinger Br.) at 6, but neither acknowl-
edges that Sure-Tan was not a standing case or that this Court 
confined its statement to “private persons like petitioners,” who 
were employers seeking to disqualify employees from voting in a 
union election. 467 U.S. at 897. 
12 
parens patriae, the States have standing to sue to 
protect these interests.13 
 But Respondent States have an even stronger 
direct argument that, as a state government, they 
must regulate and, in some cases, provide benefits for 
persons the national government allows to enter the 
country and is unable or unwilling to remove.14 In this 
way, federal action (or inaction) significantly affects 
the scope of the States’ own responsibilities. To 
equate Texas with the private plaintiffs denied stand-
ing in cases like Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614 (1973), see Pet’r Br. at 20, is to ignore the crucial 
fact that Texas is also a sovereign entity and that 
federal immigration decisions impact the State’s own 
governmental obligations.  
 In this, immigration is arguably unique. Both the 
national government and the States must govern the 
persons they find within their concurrent jurisdic-
tions. But only the national government can deter-
mine who is lawfully here or what steps will be taken 
to exclude or remove those who are unlawfully pre-
sent. Fundamental state interests in the exercise of 
their own governmental powers are thus inextricably 
 
 13 See Resp’t Br. at 30-34; see, e.g., Bradford Mank, Should 
States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: 
Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1701 (2008). 
 14 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that 
Texas cannot deny free public education to undocumented 
school-age children within its borders).  
13 
tied to federal decisions in this field. None of the 
cases cited by the United States, which involve pri-
vate individuals seeking to challenge government 
action or inaction vis-à-vis other private individuals, 
raise a comparable concern.  
 
II. Texas does not lack standing on the 
ground that its injury is “self-inflicted.” 
 The United States’ central standing argument is 
that Texas’s injury is “self-inflicted” and therefore 
“not a legally cognizable injury or one that is fairly 
traceable to the challenged federal policy.” Pet’r Br. at 
24. But this Court’s cases recognize no general doc-
trine of “self-inflicted injury.” On the contrary, the 
handful of cases that use that phrase refer to a di-
verse group of much more limited considerations, 
none of which is applicable here. The novel doctrine 
proposed by the United States, if adopted by this 
Court, would revolutionize standing law. And in any 
event, Texas’s injury is not self-inflicted.  
 
A. There is no “self-inflicted injury” rule 
under Article III. 
 Amici scholars have taught and written about 
standing for many years without being aware of any 
doctrine of “self-inflicted” injury. The closest this 
Court has come is Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 
1138 (2013), which held inter alia that the costs a 
plaintiff may incur to avoid the impact of a federal 
policy do not constitute the injury in fact needed to 
14 
challenge that policy if the impact of the policy on 
plaintiffs is itself highly uncertain. The Clapper 
plaintiffs challenged aspects of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (FISA) that authorized sur-
veillance of certain individuals outside the United 
States. The plaintiffs – who claimed to engage in 
communications with persons subject to FISA surveil-
lance – could not demonstrate that they had, in fact, 
been subjected to any FISA surveillance; instead, 
they relied on the costs they had incurred to avoid the 
possibility of such surveillance to establish their 
injury. Because these costs arose from the plaintiffs’ 
concerns that they might be subjected to surveillance, 
this Court held that “respondents’ self-inflicted inju-
ries are not fairly traceable to the Government’s 
purported activities . . . and their subjective fear of 
surveillance does not give rise to standing.” Id. at 
1152-53. 
 Clapper holds, at most, that plaintiffs who cannot 
show they are even subject to a government policy 
cannot manufacture injury in fact by voluntarily 
expending resources in anticipation of being subject 
to that policy. That is not the case here, where the 
United States cannot and does not dispute that DAPA 
will apply to persons in Texas and, as a result, affect 
the operation of Texas’s own governmental opera-
tions. Clapper, moreover, must be read in conjunction 
with other cases recognizing standing based on 
injuries that might also be characterized as “self-
inflicted.” In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 
561 U.S. 139 (2010), for example, this Court held that 
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conventional alfalfa farmers had standing to chal-
lenge a federal agency’s decision to deregulate genet-
ically engineered alfalfa. Although it was uncertain 
whether the genetically engineered alfalfa would in 
fact infect nearby conventional alfalfa farms, the 
plaintiffs undertook costly precautions against such 
infection. This Court concluded that “[s]uch harms, 
which respondents will suffer even if their crops are 
not actually infected with the Roundup-ready gene, 
are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
prong of the constitutional standing analysis.” Id. at 
155. If there were a general rule against self-inflicted 
injuries, then surely Monsanto would have come out 
the other way.15 
 Understandably, the United States does not rely 
primarily on Clapper (and does not mention Monsan-
to). Instead, its best case is Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 
426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam).16 That case consid-
ered two separate motions for leave to file complaints 
in this Court’s original jurisdiction concerning taxation 
 
 15 Clapper distinguished Monsanto on the ground that the 
farmers presented “concrete evidence to substantiate their 
fears,” as opposed to “mere conjecture about possible govern-
mental actions.” 133 S. Ct. at 1154. This confirms that the 
problem in Clapper was rooted in the uncertainty that the 
challenged government action would ever apply to the plaintiffs, 
thus rendering their precautionary expenditures not only self-
inflicted but superfluous. Given the evidentiary record and 
district court findings here, the present case is much closer to 
Monsanto than Clapper. 
 16 See, e.g., Pet’r Br. at 25 (“Pennsylvania controls.”). 
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by one state that allegedly injured other states. The 
entirety of the relevant discussion in this Court’s 
opinion is as follows: 
In neither of the suits at bar has the defen-
dant State inflicted any injury upon the 
plaintiff States through the imposition of the 
taxes held, in No. 69, and alleged, in No. 68, 
to be unconstitutional. The injuries to the 
plaintiffs’ fiscs were self-inflicted, resulting 
from decisions by their respective state legis-
latures. Nothing required Maine, Massachu-
setts, and Vermont to extend a tax credit to 
their residents for income taxes paid to New 
Hampshire, and nothing prevents Pennsyl-
vania from withdrawing that credit for taxes 
paid to New Jersey. No State can be heard to 
complain about damage inflicted by its own 
hand.  
Id. at 664. This cursory discussion is the rock upon 
which the United States rests its “self-inflicted inju-
ry” argument. 
 Pennsylvania simply cannot bear the weight that 
the United States would place upon it here. The only 
use of the term “standing” in the opinion occurs in the 
Court’s later discussion of Pennsylvania’s additional 
parens patriae claim on behalf of its citizens. Penn-
sylvania, 426 U.S. at 665-66. The Court rejected that 
claim based on other grounds having nothing to do 
with self-inflicted injury, and the United States does 
not appear to rely on that part of the opinion here. 
17 
 Amici submit that the remainder of Pennsylva-
nia’s discussion is best read as not concerning Article 
III standing at all, but rather as an application of this 
Court’s standard for exercising its original jurisdic-
tion. In Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73 (1992), 
this Court explained that “[r]ecognizing the delicate 
and grave character of our original jurisdiction, we 
have interpreted the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a) as making our original jurisdiction obligato-
ry only in appropriate cases, and as providing us with 
substantial discretion to make case-by-case judg-
ments as to the practical necessity of an original 
forum in this Court.” Id. at 76 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). One criterion is that “it 
must appear that the complaining State has suffered 
a wrong through the action of the other State,” Mas-
sachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939), and it is 
evidently this requirement that concerned the Court 
in Pennsylvania. Certainly there is conceptual over-
lap between this requirement and Article III injury in 
fact, but the original jurisdiction cases do not invoke 
Article III and there is no reason to believe that the 
standards are the same.17 As the Wright & Miller 
treatise puts it, “[t]he special concerns that have 
guided the Court in this area [original jurisdiction] 
 
 17 The standard for this Court’s original jurisdiction seems 
rather higher than the standard for Article III injury in fact. See, 
e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n.18 (1983) (“The 
model case for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is a 
dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount 
to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign.”). 
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are unique to its own jurisdictional problems, and do 
not provide a sure basis for analogous reasoning in 
other areas of state standing.”18 
 In any event, the novel requirement proposed by 
the United States would have radical implications for 
standing doctrine. The United States suggests that 
an injury is self-inflicted, and therefore unable to 
support standing, any time it could have been avoided 
if the plaintiff had taken some further action. That 
radical doctrine would eliminate standing in any 
number of landmark decisions of this Court. The 
plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), could have avoided the injury of segregation 
by homeschooling their children, for example. But 
because the laws in question were unconstitutional, 
the plaintiffs were not required to alter their affairs 
to avoid them. 
 Most injuries can be avoided by some action or 
other; the question is whether the plaintiff could have 
so easily avoided its injury that it lacks any real 
personal stake in the dispute.19 Certainly the 
justiciability rules do not require the States to take 
evasive action at all costs to avoid injury at the hands 
of federal law. When a state law has been held invalid 
 
 18 Richard D. Freer & Edward H. Cooper, 13B Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 3531.11.1 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database 
updated April 2015). 
 19 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) 
(observing that “the standing question is whether the plaintiff has 
alleged . . . a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy”). 
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on federal constitutional grounds, for example, the 
state has standing to appeal that judgment based on 
the injury that inheres in not being able to enforce its 
law;20 no one says that this injury is “self-inflicted” 
because the state did not have to enact its law in the 
first place. Texas was not required here to alter its 
legal regime to accommodate a change in federal law 
that injured it, without first having the opportunity 
to challenge the validity of that federal change. See, 
e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601 (recog-
nizing a State’s “sovereign interest” in “the power to 
create and enforce a legal code”).21 
 
B. Texas’s injury is not “self-inflicted.” 
 Even if this Court were to adopt a rule foreclos-
ing standing based on “self-inflicted” injuries, no 
plausible version of that rule would cover Texas’s 
claim here. Texas adopted its policy of permitting all 
persons legally present in its jurisdiction to apply for 
driver’s licenses long before DAPA, foreclosing any 
claim that it adopted the policy as a post hoc attempt 
to manufacture standing for its challenge to DAPA. 
 
 20 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (permitting 
a state government intervenor to appeal a judgment invalidat-
ing a state law because “a State clearly has a legitimate interest 
in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”). 
 21 See also Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massa-
chusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues other than 
Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 1, 7 (2007) (noting 
that “the state . . . has a sovereign interest in preserving its own 
law” that “should be sufficient for Article III purposes”). 
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Compare Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151 (“[R]espondents 
cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting 
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothet-
ical future harm that is not certainly impending.”).22 
More fundamentally, Texas’s reliance on the federal 
definition of lawful presence was entirely appropri-
ate, given the primary role that federal authorities 
play in the immigration field. 
 As a border state with a large immigrant popula-
tion (both lawful and unlawful), Texas must address 
which members of this population are eligible for 
state benefits and services. Given the national gov-
ernment’s primary authority over immigration, it is 
natural for the States to defer to federal decisions as 
to who is lawfully present when making these deci-
sions. Texas has not made some sort of idiosyncratic 
choice here; it has not pulled out some obscure provi-
sion of federal law and made it the touchstone of 
eligibility for state benefits. Rather, it has simply 
decided that, given the federal government’s primary 
role in determining who may lawfully enter the 
country and whom it will undertake to remove, 
anyone federal authorities authorize to remain will be 
eligible for certain state benefits. Indeed, given the 
United States’ repeated emphasis on its exclusive 
authority over these matters,23 it is decidedly odd for 
it to criticize Texas for relying on federal definitions. 
 
 22 It is only on this narrow point that Clapper cited Penn-
sylvania. See id. 
 23 See, e.g., Pet’r Brief at 13, 19-20. 
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Adopting the United States’ position on “self-inflicted” 
injury would create perverse incentives for states to 
adopt their own definitions of lawful presence for 
purposes of state law, in order to protect themselves 
from unexpected changes in the federal regime that 
states would lack standing to challenge.  
 Critically, the United States has taken the posi-
tion that States are not free to adopt their own defini-
tions that diverge from federal immigration policy. As 
Texas notes, Resp’t Br. at 23 n.20, the United States 
argued to the Ninth Circuit that because federal 
power over immigration is exclusive, “a State general-
ly may not establish classifications that distinguish 
among aliens whom the federal government has treated 
similarly.”24 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that 
both the Equal Protection Clause and (probably) 
federal preemption precluded Arizona (a respondent 
in the present case) from “target[ing] DACA recipi-
ents for disparate treatment.” Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. 
v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Amici take no position on whether either the United 
States’ or the Ninth Circuit’s views are correct. But 
surely it is a reasonable course for state governments 
to avoid these potential conflicts with federal law by 
incorporating federal definitions in this sensitive 
 
 24 United States’ Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellees, at 8 in Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-
15307, U.S. App. LEXIS 14423 (9th Cir. Aug. 2015). See also J.A. 
309. 
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field. Such accommodation should hardly be charac-
terized as “self-inflicted injury.” 
 The special role of federal law in the immigration 
context resolves the United States’ concern that state 
governments will gratuitously incorporate elements 
of federal law on any number of subjects into their 
own legal regimes, then use that incorporation as 
leverage to challenge federal policy. Whether or not 
that hypothetical is a plausible expectation of how 
state governments are likely to employ their own 
limited resources, the field of immigration law is 
unique on account of federal law’s primary role. 
Although state income tax regimes frequently incor-
porate the federal definition of taxable income, see 
Pet’r Br. at 32, for example, it is well-settled that the 
national government lacks exclusive or even primary 
authority over taxation.25 State incorporation is a 
matter of convenience. If this Court wished to limit 
state standing to challenge changes in federal law 
that trigger effects under state law, it could sensibly 
draw the line between gratuitous incorporation of 
this kind and incorporation that is arguably com-
pelled, such as federal immigration law’s definition of 
lawful presence.26 
 
 25 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
425 (1819). 
 26 Amici do not say such a line is essential. Many other 
constraints limit improvident state challenges, such as resource 
and political constraints or the possible lack of a cause of action 
or substantive legal basis for challenging a change in federal tax 
policy. 
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 The United States’ amicus make the extraordi-
nary claim that it does not actually matter whether 
Texas can change its eligibility criteria for driver’s 
licenses: “That there may be constitutional or other 
limits on Texas’s options for changing its driver’s-
license program to avoid its self-imposed ‘harm’ does 
not change the analysis.” Dellinger Br. at 15. This is 
because “[t]hose exogenous constraints do not arise 
from the Guidance and are therefore not relevant to 
the question of respondents’ standing to challenge it.” 
Id.27 But amicus can hardly be arguing that the 
Respondent States’ challenge is better directed at the 
Supremacy or Equal Protection Clauses. If federal 
statutory or constitutional law makes state incorpo-
ration of federal immigration law non-optional, then 
injuries arising from changes in federal immigration 
rules are simply not “self-inflicted.”  
 In any event, DAPA presented Texas with a 
range of choices, each of which constituted cognizable 
injury. It could have adopted its own definition of 
which aliens are eligible for driver’s licenses, risking 
a constitutional challenge and imposing distinctions 
among aliens that Texas itself may have viewed as 
unfair; it could have, as the United States insists, 
 
 27 The United States’ amici assert that the dormant Com-
merce Clause would have prevented Pennsylvania changing its 
tax scheme in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey. Dellinger Br. at 15-16 
& n.7. The Pennsylvania Court’s cursory discussion of “self-
inflicted” injury did not consider this point, which underscores 
that that case should not be read as sub silentio articulating a 
fundamental principle of standing doctrine. 
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raised the fees for driver’s license applications to 
cover its additional costs, which would have entailed 
either increasing costs for persons it had previously 
chosen to assist or imposing potentially problematic 
distinctions among them; or it could have taken no 
action and simply absorbed the cost of additional 
driver’s license applications. The important point is 
that each of these choices either involves additional 
costs or legislative action departing from Texas’s 
preferred legal regime. Each option, in other words, 
would amount to a concrete injury in fact. And so the 
fact that DAPA presented Texas with a choice among 
bad options cannot make its injury “self-inflicted.” 
 
III. Recognizing state standing here will 
vindicate – not disrupt – our constitution-
al structure. 
 The United States remarkably asserts that “[i]n 
the immigration context alone, the court of appeals’ 
theory would give States virtually unfettered ability 
to conscript courts into entertaining their complaints 
about federal policies.” Pet’r Br. at 31. And it worries 
that “States could interfere with the federal govern-
ment’s administration of the law in many other 
contexts as well.” Id. at 32. This rhetoric presupposes 
a conclusion. Parties with valid injuries in fact do not 
“conscript” courts into hearing their legal claims, and 
valid claims that a federal agency has exceeded its 
statutory authority or omitted necessary procedural 
steps do not “interfere” with federal administration. 
But the United States may be making a broader point 
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about the separation of powers – that is, that major 
public controversies should not be resolved in court, 
especially not at the behest of institutional actors like 
state governments. 
 Article III, of course, contains no exception for 
major controversies, and any rule that sought to 
distinguish between major and minor disputes would 
be hopelessly indeterminate. Moreover, nothing in 
Article III limits the rights of States to pursue their 
own claims in federal fora.28 Instead, this Court has 
said States are “entitled to special solicitude in our 
standing analysis.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007). States are, in fact, particularly appropri-
ate litigants for aggregating the diffuse interests at 
stake in controversies like this one. And precisely 
because they are governments, the States suffer more 
concrete harms. 
 Critically, the gravamen of Respondent States’ 
claims on the merits in this case is that the ordinary 
processes for resolving policy disputes about immi-
gration or other issues have been cut off by the feder-
al Executive’s unilateral action. The States are 
 
 28 One perverse consequence of the United States’ position 
would be to encourage States to litigate these sorts of disputes in 
their own courts. If the United States is right about Article III 
standing, then these cases would not be removable to federal 
court, and it is unclear that the state courts would lack authori-
ty to issue some relief. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. 
Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart and 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 435-37 
(7th ed. 2015) (noting continuing uncertainty). 
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politically represented in Congress, but the States’ 
claim is that the Executive has circumvented the 
legislative process here. And States are entitled to 
participate in the administrative process as well, but 
the States argue that the federal Executive has pre-
vented that by denying notice and comment under 
the APA. These aspects of the case both make the 
States’ standing particularly pressing here and pro-
vide potential limiting principles in future litigation. 
 
A. The States are effective litigants for 
vindicating diffuse interests. 
 Massachusetts v. EPA’s “special solicitude” for 
States’ standing makes sound functional sense, 
because States will often be uniquely appropriate 
litigants for certain sorts of claims. States can play 
this role, moreover, without requiring this Court to 
recognize any special rule of standing for state liti-
gants. All that is necessary is to recognize that States 
are governments, and governments have interests 
and responsibilities that private litigants may not 
share. 
 One of the most difficult problems in federal 
practice and procedure concerns the appropriate 
mechanisms for aggregating claims that affect large 
numbers of people but that individual litigants lack 
the incentives or the wherewithal to pursue. Standing 
doctrine often creates or exacerbates the aggregation 
problem. Here, for example, the persons most directly 
affected by DAPA are the unlawfully present aliens 
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granted legal presence. These persons, of course, are 
unlikely to challenge the program. But the natural 
persons arguably injured by DAPA – the voters whose 
representatives voted for the federal statutes that 
DAPA arguably transgresses, or the federal and state 
taxpayers whose resources will be diverted to pay 
DAPA’s significant expenses – lack individual stand-
ing under settled law.  
 Our law has adopted a number of solutions – 
such as class actions or organizational standing – for 
aggregating claims that are impracticable to bring on 
an individual basis. But these mechanisms all have 
their problems, and none addresses the lack of indi-
vidual standing when injuries occur to diffuse public 
interests. States, however, are empowered by state 
constitutions and the Tenth Amendment to represent 
the diffuse public interest of their citizens. 
 One significant advantage that States have over 
private organizations and class actions is that they 
have built-in mechanisms of democratic accountabil-
ity for their conduct of litigation on behalf of their 
citizens.29 Justices of this Court have complained that 
the use of “private attorneys general” to enforce 
federal law raises significant problems of public 
accountability, and similar concerns exist about 
 
 29 Mank, supra, at 1784 (discussing checks on state litiga-
tion). 
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accountability of class counsel in class actions.30 State 
officials who sue on behalf of their citizens are politi-
cally accountable for their actions, however. A recent 
re-election campaign by the Texas Attorney General, 
for example, featured public debate about the appro-
priateness of the State’s participation in litigation 
challenging the Affordable Care Act.31  
 Litigation by States fits well into a constitutional 
system predicated on the notion that no one person or 
institution can lay a unique claim to the public inter-
est. Our system of both vertical and horizontal checks 
and balances recognizes that the public benefits when 
multiple institutions can step in if a particular officer 
or agency fails to pursue the public welfare or respect 
legal constraints. Even in an area of strong national 
interest like immigration, the national Executive is 
not, and cannot be, judge in its own case. By accord-
ing “special solicitude” to States’ standing, Massachu-
setts v. EPA facilitated States’ valuable role in the 
process by which every political institution is held 
accountable to the rule of law. 
 
 30 See, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing private attorneys general); In re GMC Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 
1995) (noting concern about lack of accountability of class 
counsel). 
 31 See Chuck Lindell, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott 
Opposes Federal Government on Many Fronts, Austin American-
Statesman, Aug. 7, 2010, available at http://www.statesman. 
com/news/texaspolitics/texas-attorney-general-greg-abbott-opposes- 
federal-government-847623.html?printArticle=y. 
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 DAPA’s impact on the public is diffuse. But 
because States, as governments, are immediately 
responsible for governing whomever the national 
government decides to allow to remain within the 
country, States suffer direct and immediate conse-
quences. The cost of issuing driver’s licenses, as we 
have said and the district court found, is only the 
most salient example. 
 
B. The government action challenged here 
has cut off States’ ordinary political 
and administrative remedies. 
 Throughout their submissions, the United States 
and its amici assert that this dispute should be 
reserved to the national political branches. See, e.g., 
Pet’r Br. at 12. There is a deep irony to this claim, 
because the essence of the States’ argument is that 
the national Executive has circumvented the political 
and administrative processes that would otherwise 
give States a voice. These processes include the 
ordinary legislative process in Congress, which repre-
sents the States, as well as the APA’s notice and com-
ment procedure, which would ordinarily afford affected 
States an opportunity for direct participation. 
 This Court recognized in Snapp that “the State 
has an interest in securing observance of the terms 
under which it participates in the federal system.” 
458 U.S. at 607-08. And the federalism jurisprudence 
has long acknowledged that “the principal means 
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the 
30 
States in the federal system lies in the structure of 
the Federal Government itself ” – particularly the 
representation of the States in Congress. Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 
(1985).32 This Court has given life to these “political 
safeguards” of federalism by insisting that Congress 
make the crucial decisions that affect important state 
interests.33 Whether or not these political safeguards 
are sufficient to obviate the need for judicial enforce-
ment of other constitutional limits on national au-
thority, doctrines protecting Congress’s role have been 
critical to sustaining our federal structure.34 
 It is thus crucial that States have standing to 
complain when Congress – and therefore States 
representation in that body – is cut out of the loop. If 
States have standing to make no other constitutional 
objection, they must nonetheless be allowed to make 
this one. Because Congress’s role supplies the bul-
wark protection for state interests, the circumvention 
of the legislative process that Respondent States 
 
 32 See also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 
(1954). 
 33 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) 
(“[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the 
political process the protection of the States against intrusive 
exercises of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, we must be 
absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federal-
ism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349 (2001). 
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allege here works a unique injury to their interests. 
And the United States cannot be heard to argue that 
this dispute over immigration policy should be de-
ferred to political resolution when the national Exec-
utive has made an end-run around that very political 
process in which Respondent States would otherwise 
have been represented. 
 The other possible avenue for state participation 
in a policy debate over immigration would be through 
the notice and comment procedure guaranteed by the 
APA. To be sure, the APA puts state commenters on 
the same plane as any private party, rather than 
affording them the structural representation they 
receive in the national legislative process. But at 
least notice and comment is a form of participation. 
Respondent States claim here that they have been 
wrongfully denied that very opportunity to partici-
pate. Whatever other claims the States may or may 
not have standing to bring, they must at least have 
standing to challenge the decision to foreclose their 
participation in administrative decisions that cause 
them concrete injury. 
 The political process to which the United States 
asks this Court to defer, therefore, is simply the 
internal deliberations of the national Executive 
Branch. The Executive would be judge in its own 
case, having cut off both legislative debate and partic-
ipatory agency deliberation. Having been excluded 
from the avenues of participation ordinarily open to 
them, the Respondent States must at a minimum 
have standing to challenge their exclusion. 
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IV. The Respondent States have standing under 
the APA. 
 The United States argues that the Respondent 
States lack standing because they do not fall within 
the zone of interests of the Immigration and Natural-
ization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. Pet’r Br. at 
33-36. On its own terms, this argument rests on an 
overly cramped reading of the INA’s purposes. But in 
any event, the United States misconceives the rele-
vant legal provisions for its zone of interests argu-
ment. Respondent States have raised claims not only 
that DAPA is inconsistent with the INA, but also that 
the Executive has failed to meet its obligations under 
the notice and comment provisions of the APA and the 
Take Care Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Standing to 
bring those claims turns on the respective zones of 
interests of those provisions, not the INA. 
 The Respondent States have sued under Section 
10 of the APA, which provides that “[a] person suffer-
ing legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Speaking of this 
language, then-judge Scalia observed that “[t]he zone 
of interests adequate to sustain judicial review is 
particularly broad in suits to compel federal agency 
compliance with law, since Congress itself has pared 
back traditional prudential limitations by the [APA].” 
FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 357 
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(D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal quotation omitted).35 More 
recently, he wrote for this Court that “in the APA 
context, . . . the [zone of interests] test is not ‘especial-
ly demanding.’ ” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014) (quot-
ing Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)). “In 
that context,” the Lexmark Court explained, “we have 
often ‘conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in 
the test to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes 
to the plaintiff,’ and have said that the test ‘forecloses 
suit only when a plaintiff ’s interests are so marginal-
ly related to or inconsistent with the purposes implic-
it in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed 
that’ Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” Id. 
(quoting Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2210). 
 The United States cannot make that showing 
here. Its argument is that “Respondents cannot 
satisfy this [zone of interests] requirement because no 
relevant statute protects a State from bearing the 
costs of a voluntary state-law subsidy for driver’s 
licenses.” Pet’r Br. at 34. Aside from conflating zone of 
interests with their self-inflicted injury argument, the 
United States’ assertion runs directly counter to this 
Court’s repeated admonition that “[w]e do not require 
any ‘indication of congressional purpose to benefit the 
would-be plaintiff.’ ” Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 
 
 35 In Akins, 524 U.S. at 19, this Court said that “[h]istory 
associates the word ‘aggrieved’ with a congressional intent to 
cast the standing net broadly.” 
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(quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400). The question, 
in other words, is whether issues concerning who may 
lawfully remain in the United States, and the extent 
to which immigration imposes obligations on affected 
governments, fall within the scope of the INA.36 That 
question answers itself. 
 The scope of the INA is not the question, howev-
er, when it comes to Respondents’ claims under the 
Take Care Clause and the notice and comment provi-
sions of the APA.37 The United States is correct that 
when a party sues under the general provisions of the 
APA to challenge the consistency of agency action 
with some other statute, such as the INA, then the 
relevant zone of interests concerns that other statute. 
But the right to notice and comment is created by the 
APA itself; for suits seeking to enforce that require-
ment, then, the APA both creates the cause of action 
and the underlying procedural right to be enforced. 
As this Court recognized in Lexmark, “[w]hether a 
plaintiff comes within the ‘zone of interests’ is an 
 
 36 Cf. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 n.7 (recognizing that 
Indian Reorganization Act, authorizing acquisition of land for 
Indian tribes, was not meant to benefit non-Indian landowners 
who live nearby, but holding that the zone of interests question 
was simply “whether issues of land use (arguably) fall within 
[the IRA’s] scope – because if they do, a neighbor complaining 
about such use may sue to enforce the statute’s limits”). 
 37 Even if Respondents’ notice and comment claim had to 
fall within the zone of interests of the INA itself, it would surely 
do so. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (“Consultation between 
federal and state officials is an important feature of the immi-
gration system.”). 
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issue that requires us to determine . . . whether a 
legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a 
particular plaintiff ’s claim.” 134 S. Ct. at 1387. 
Respondents are entitled to sue because they are 
“aggrieved,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, by the denial of their 
procedural rights under 5 U.S.C. § 553. And there is 
no doubt that the latter provision embodies broad 
interests in participation by persons affected by agen-
cy action.38 
 Government entities whose own regulatory 
responsibilities will be affected by national agency 
action fall squarely within the zone of interests 
protected by the APA notice and comment require-
ment.39 A recent Eighth Circuit decision provides a 
good example. In Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 
F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2013), local governments chal-
lenged an EPA action for effectively making new 
legislative rules without notice and comment in 
violation of procedural requirement in both the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) and the APA. Ruling that the cities 
had established Article III standing, the court of 
appeals recognized that “[t]he League’s members 
have a concrete interest not only in being able to meet 
 
 38 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 
(1979) (“In enacting the APA, Congress made a judgment that 
notions of fairness and informed administrative decisionmaking 
require that agency decisions be made only after affording 
interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment.”). 
 39 See generally Comment, State Standing to Challenge 
Federal Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens 
Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1069, 1094-1103 (1977). 
36 
their regulatory responsibilities but in avoiding 
regulatory obligations above and beyond those that 
can be statutorily imposed upon them. Notice and 
comment procedures for EPA rulemaking under the 
CWA were undoubtedly designed to protect the con-
crete interests of such regulated entities by ensuring 
that they are treated with fairness and transparency 
after due consideration and industry participation.” 
Id. at 871.40  
 The analysis concerning Respondents’ Take Care 
claim is similar. The United States makes two argu-
ments concerning the Take Care Clause relevant to 
justiciability. The first is that this claim raises a 
nonjusticiable political question because “to under-
take such an inquiry would express a ‘lack of the 
respect due’ to the Nation’s highest elected official.” 
Pet’r Br. at 73 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
217 (1962)). Courts do not dismiss constitutional 
claims on the ground that they are disrespectful to 
the government, of course, and no decision of this 
Court has ever found a case nonjusticiable on this 
ground.  
 The second argument is that the Take Care 
Clause does not furnish a cause of action. But as 
Respondents note, Resp’t Br. at 73, there is a long 
 
 40 Although the quoted language emphasized notice and 
comment procedures in the CWA, the plaintiff cities also sued 
under the APA and the court cited this Court’s APA cases. See 
711 F.3d at 871 (citing Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 316). 
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history of equitable relief against executive officials 
acting in violation of law, and in any event it is un-
clear why the APA would not also provide a vehicle 
for a Take Care claim. In the latter situation, the 
relevant question would be whether plaintiffs fell 
within the zone of interests of the Take Care Clause 
itself, not the INA. Whether the Take Care Clause 
creates enforceable rights and the exact contours of 
the obligations it imposes on the Executive are, to be 
sure, difficult questions. But if there are problems 
with Respondents’ Take Care claim, they do not arise 
from the zone of interests doctrine. 
 It is true that many potential plaintiffs fall 
within the zone of interests of the APA’s notice and 
comment provisions and the Take Care Clause as we 
have construed them. But that simply reflects the 
fact that the zone of interest test is “not especially 
demanding,” Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389, especially 
in the APA context. The more important constraints 
arise from Article III. Given the Respondent States’ 
allegation of a concrete injury in fact under the 
constitutional standard, the zone of interests argu-
ments raise no additional bar here. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit should be affirmed insofar as it upheld 
the States’ standing to sue in this matter. 
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